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We study the interaction between competitive markets that produce large but unequally distributed 
welfare gains and elections through which the poor majority can redistribute income away from the 
rich minority. In our simple laboratory democracy, subjects first earn their income by trading in a 
double auction market and thereafter vote on redistributive policies in two-candidate elections. In 
addition, in one of the treatments subjects can attempt to influence the candidates’ policy choices by 
transferring money to them. We observe very high levels of redistribution—even when transfers to 
candidates are possible—with little effect on market efficiency. Overall, the experimental results are 
explained by our equilibrium predictions. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern democracies rely on two vital institutions: markets and elections. Citizens regularly 
participate in a variety of markets and, in this way, generate welfare. However, this welfare 
is typically unequally distributed. For example, in the Netherlands the top quintile gets 40% 
and the two top quintiles 62%  of the total pre-tax income. For the United States these 
numbers are 45% and 69% (World Bank Annual Report 2007).1
So far, experimental markets and elections have been studied in isolation. Many 
laboratory markets—in particular the double auction market of Smith (1962)—reliably clear 
at equilibrium quantities and prices, and in this way generate full efficiency, that is, they 
produce the maximum possible welfare (for surveys see, Davis and Holt 1993; Kagel and 
Roth 1995). Similarly, laboratory elections with compulsory simple majority voting reliably 
result in outcomes preferred by the majority (for a survey see, McKelvey and Ordeshook 
1990). While the large experimental literature on both institutions has substantially 
contributed to our understanding of how markets and elections function, it sheds relatively 
little  light on the performance of these institutions when they coexist. How is  market 
performance affected by redistributive taxes? In anticipation of possible effects on market 
 By contrast, by participating 
in elections, citizens have the opportunity to moderate welfare inequalities. Namely, if those 
with incomes in the bottom three quintiles support a strong redistributive policy, they could 
substantially reduce—even eliminate—the welfare gap between the rich and themselves. 
However, this is in stark contrast to the observed persistence throughout the world of a 
majority of citizens earning incomes below the national average. In other words, neither 
governments nor the poor seem to endorse largely egalitarian incomes. In this paper, we 
study whether income inequalities can persist in a laboratory experiment where subjects 
earn their incomes in markets and thereafter vote on redistributive taxes in two-candidate 
elections. The laboratory allows us to directly measure the welfare and redistribution effects 
of the interaction of these two institutions in a controlled environment. 
                                                             
1 See also Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson (2007) for evidence that hunter gatherer societies, which are more 
autarkic, display less income inequality than both modern and ancient cities, which have market economies. 2 
outcomes, to what extent do poor majorities support redistribution?  Do rich minorities 
utilize their higher incomes to influence election outcomes and the level of redistribution?  
In our experiment, citizens first  earn  their—unequally distributed—income in a 
double auction  market (Smith 1962), thereafter, two candidates select  redistributive tax 
policies and compete in simple majority elections in which all citizens get to vote. To mimic 
the income inequalities observed in democracies around the world, we chose the market 
parameters such that, in equilibrium, there is a rich minority and a poor majority. Hence, 
candidates have an incentive to woo the poor with high redistribution. In an additional 
setup, citizens also have the opportunity  to lobby, that is, to transfer money  to the 
candidates. If candidates respond to these transfers—they have no obligation to do so—the 
high concentration of pre-tax income gives the rich minority an advantage over the poor in 
influencing redistributive policies. In other words, the principle of “one person, one vote”, 
which gives each citizen the same political influence, may be counteracted by the principle of 
“one dollar, one vote”, which translates into more influence by the rich.  
We think our experimental setup is of particular interest because it captures three 
prevalent facts. First, most countries have a poor majority with pre-tax incomes that lie well 
below the national average. Second, governments are capable of redistributing resources 
from the rich to the poor. Third, modern democracies have numerous special interest groups 
that use—legal and illegal—means to transfer resources to candidates with the purpose of 
influencing redistributive policies. Therefore, our basic experimental setup can shed light on 
two puzzling phenomena in modern democracies: namely, the high concentration of after-
tax income in a minority of citizens,2
It is well known that too much redistribution may  reduce, or even destroy, the 
markets’ ability to produce welfare gains, in which case, high levels of redistributive taxes 
may not be in the interest of the poor.  There are numerous means through which 
 and the common practice of lobbying by compensating 
political candidates in spite of the impossibility of writing enforceable contracts (e.g., due to 
legal prohibition). 
                                                             
2 According to the 2007 World Bank Annual Report, in all democracies a majority of citizens have below-average 
after-tax income. 3 
redistribution can negatively affect market performance.3
No doubt, political decision making unavoidably evokes conflict between those 
involved. Here is where special interest groups, or lobbyists, enter the political arena. The 
resources used by lobbyists are far from being marginal. For example, in the United States a 
total of 14,838 lobbyists spent $3.30 billion on lobbying in 2008.
 In this paper, we concentrate on 
welfare losses that result from individuals abstaining from market activity or trading 
carelessly because of lower marginal incentives. We use a double auction market (Smith 
1962)  because it has been shown to reliably produce  efficient outcomes  in  experiments 
without redistribution. Hence, we test whether these markets  are robust in the more 
realistic environment where traders anticipate that their market incomes will be 
redistributed. In the double auction market, even with full redistribution (i.e., everyone gets 
the same after-tax earnings) there is a small incentive to trade. As a consequence, standard 
equilibrium analysis—that is, supply and demand analysis—predicts that the double auction 
market is efficient in spite of redistributive taxation. However, it is reasonable to conjecture 
that redistributive taxation may affect market activity and outcomes (e.g., price volatility and 
efficiency) in ways not foreseen by market equilibrium.  For example, many experiments 
have demonstrated the impact of reduced marginal incentives (e.g., Goeree and Holt 2001; 
Isaac and Walker 1988; McKelvey and Palfrey 1995; 1998), which in the double auction 
market translates to careless trading and an increased probability of inefficient transactions. 
Moreover,  there is a large literature on intentions and bargaining that suggests that 
depriving people of their ‘fair’ share of a surplus, such as with taxes that are ‘too high’, can 
lead to emotional retaliation through the destruction of income (e.g., Bosman and  van 
Winden 2002; Camerer 2003), which in our setting can be achieved by abstaining from 
market activity. 
4
                                                             
3 For example, high redistribution may decrease the poor’s income if it reduces economic growth (e.g., Browning 
2002) or stimulates migration of the more productive members of society to other countries. 
 In this paper, we are 
interested in whether and, if so, how monetary transfers to the candidates prior to policy 
making can influence income redistribution. As in most democracies, transfers to candidates 
4 Data from http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php (from August 20, 2009). 4 
do not bind the candidates’ actions and therefore the effectiveness of lobbying depends on 
whether candidates decide to reciprocate lobbying efforts.  Moreover, because the 
opportunity  to lobby is given to both  rich  and poor, counteractive lobbying may arise 
(Austen-Smith and Wright 1992, 1994). Thus, even if candidates choose full redistribution, 
the poor majority may lobby in order to weaken or outweigh the lobbying attempts towards 
lower taxation of the rich.5
By keeping our laboratory democracy simple, we obviously omit a variety of plausible 
explanations of why income distributions are not more egalitarian. These include, but are 
not limited to:  expected  social mobility  (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Alesina and 
Rodrik 1994; Benhabib and Rustichini 1996), economic inefficiencies caused by 
redistribution such as leaky buckets (Browning 2002), the existence of outside options (e.g., 
tax migration), corruption of courts and political processes (e.g., Glaeser, Scheinkman, and 
Shleifer 2002), concerns for the survival of democracy (Benhabib and Przeworski 2006), and 
different benchmarks of equality such as ‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘equality of outcomes’ 
(Bénabou and Tirole 2006).
 Lastly, in our setup any kind of explicit coordination, such as 
communication, is prohibited, which creates a challenging task for all involved in the 
lobbying process. For example, it is not immediately obvious what a successful lobbying 
strategy is—in the field, lobbyist make similar campaign contributions to both preferred and 
non-preferred candidates—and after receiving money candidates still need to coordinate on 
a redistributive policy in order to keep money flowing in the future. Note that all pre-tax 
market incomes in the society are public information and, in this respect, there is no 
informational role for  lobbyists  to play (as  it does in  Ainsworth 1993; Grossman and 
Helpman 2001; Potters and van Winden 1992; 2000). 
6
                                                             
5 As in many rent seeking models, we model lobbying transfers as sunk costs (e.g., Tullock 1980) which remain 
with the candidates irrespective of their redistributive policies. See Großer, Reuben, and Tymula (2009a,b) for  
cases in which counteractive lobbying by the poor is not possible and Großer, Reuben, and Tymula (2009b) for a 
case where candidates are rewarded after they have chosen their redistributive policy. 
 Hence, our experiment can be seen as a first step in studying in 
6 For more comprehensive discussions see Browning (2002), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and Rosen and Gayer 
(2007). Bénabou (2000) relates differences in redistribution between countries to imperfect credit and insurance 5 
isolation some of the means though which markets and elections interact and the welfare 
consequences of this interaction. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first laboratory experiment that studies how 
markets and elections function when they coexist. Related to our study are the experiments 
of Durante and Putterman (2009) and Esarey, Salmon, and Barrilleaux (2009). Durante and 
Putterman (2009) study the importance of fairness preferences and risk aversion in 
determining support for redistribution, distinguishing between earned and unearned 
income, choices of involved subjects and outside observers, and certainty and uncertainty 
about pre-tax earnings. They find that self-interest and risk-aversion can explain most of the 
support for redistributive policies and that redistribution is greater when income is ‘earned’ 
rather than ‘unearned’. Esarey, Salmon, and Barrilleaux  examine  the  degree  to which 
redistributive  taxation  can be explained by fairness-based voting in elections. In their 
experiment, subjects earn pre-tax incomes in a real effort task and “vote” by proposing tax 
rates from which the median proposal is chosen. They find that voting is primarily motivated 
by self-interest and that productivity is not affected by taxation. By contrast, Tyran and 
Sausgruber (2006) study voting where a poor minority cannot achieve redistribution on its 
own. However, they show that redistribution occurs due to enough rich and middle income 
subjects  being motivated by fairness concerns. Our study is different  from  these two 
experiments in various respects. For example, we investigate the effect of redistribution on 
markets, allow for endogenous tax policies through candidate competition, and we  also 
examine the effect of lobbying on elections. 
2. Experimental games 
In this section, we describe our experimental games. In each game there is a society of 
𝑖𝑖 = 1,…,10 citizens and in two games there are also two candidates, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵. 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
markets. There is also a literature that studies the positive effect of inequality on the level of redistribution, 
caused by a poorer median voter in more unequal societies (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981; Romer 1975). Finally, 
Campante (2007) studies redistribution when political participation (i.e, voting and campaign contributions) is 
endogenous. 6 
2.1 Markets with exogenous redistributive taxation 
This game is a standard double auction market (Smith 1962) with the added twist that 
market incomes may be subject to exogenously-determined redistributive taxation. Each 
citizen is assigned to be one of the five sellers or five buyers in the market. Each seller and 
buyer can trade up to two units of a homogenous good. Seller 𝑖𝑖 earns 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖1
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1 if she 
sells her first unit plus 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖2
𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2 if she sells her second unit, where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes her cost 
of producing—or minimum willingness to accept—the 𝑖𝑖th unit and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the price she receives 
for it. Similarly, buyer 𝑖𝑖 earns 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 if she purchases her 𝑖𝑖th unit, where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes 
her value—or maximum willingness to pay—for the 𝑖𝑖th unit and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the price she pays for it. 
Units that are not traded yield zero-income. Both 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are exogenous and vary across 
citizens and units (the specific parameters used in our experiment and the resulting supply 
and demand curves are shown in Figure 1). In summary, each seller’s pre-tax market income 
is given by 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠 ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖1𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖1
𝑠𝑠 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖2




𝑏𝑏 , where 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if she trades her 𝑖𝑖th unit and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 otherwise. In the experiment, 
earnings were expressed in points, which were exchanged for cash at a rate of €1 for 17 
points at the end of the session. 
The following trading and information rules apply:7
                                                             
7 These rules and our parameters are similar to those used in typical experiments of double action markets (see 
Davis and Holt 1993; Kagel and Roth 1998). 
  (i) the market opens for two 
minutes; (ii) for their 𝑖𝑖th (untraded) unit, sellers can post an integer price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,…,𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 −
1}, where 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ≤ 100 denotes the standing seller price (i.e., the current lowest price posted by 
a seller or 100 if there is no posting so far), and buyers can post an integer price 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈
{𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 + 1,…,𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}, where 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0 denotes the standing buyer price (i.e., the current highest price 
posted by a buyer or 0 if there is no posting so far); (iii) sellers can accept a standing buyer 
price  (i.e., 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏),  as long as 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and buyers can accept a standing seller price 
(i.e., 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠),  as long as  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, which means that pre-tax incomes are always non-
negative; (iv) each seller and buyer must trade her units one at a time, starting with the first 
unit; (v) buyers cannot resell units they have bought; (vi) if a transaction occurs, standing 7 
prices are removed and the posting and accepting of prices starts all over again until the 
market closes; (vii) communication is not allowed (traders can only observe all posted and 
accepted prices); and finally, (viii) it is public information that rules (i) to (vii) hold, that 
there are five sellers and five buyers, and that each trader is informed about her own costs or 
values but not the costs and values of others.8
In contrast to standard double auction markets, we introduce an exogenous tax rate, 
𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,1], that determines the degree of income redistribution among citizens and is public 
information when the market opens. Specifically, each citizen 𝑖𝑖’s final payoff (i.e., after-tax 
market income) is given by  𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,  with  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝑡𝑡(𝜋𝜋 � − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖)  being her positive or 




ℎ=1   the average pre-tax market income of all 
 
                                                             
8 In our experiment, subjects repeatedly participated in the same double auction market and their roles, costs, 
and values never changed. 
 
Figure 1 – Supply and demand in the double auction market 
Note: The figure shows the costs assigned to the five sellers (labeled S1,…, S5) and the values assigned to the 
five buyers (labeled B1,…, B5). On the supply curve, each step represents the cost of one of the 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 units 
of the good, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖1 < 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖2 for each seller 𝑖𝑖. Similarly, on the demand curve, each step represents the 
value of one of the 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2 units of the good, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖1 > 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖2 for each buyer 𝑖𝑖. Supply and demand curves 
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citizens. Thus, each citizen i with pre-tax income strictly smaller than average may receive a 
transfer payment, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 < 𝜋𝜋 � ⇒ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0; each 𝑖𝑖 with pre-tax income strictly larger than average 
may make a transfer payment, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 > 𝜋𝜋 � ⇒ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ≤ 0; and each 𝑖𝑖 with pre-tax income equal to the 
average neither receives nor makes a transfer payment, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋 � ⇒ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 0. Note that this is a 
zero-sum redistribution scheme: transfers do not generate any welfare gains or losses. 
2.2 Markets with endogenous redistributive taxation 
This game has three consecutive decision-making stages: first a ‘market’ stage, second a ‘tax 
competition’ stage, and third an ‘election’ stage. In the market stage, citizens earn their pre-
tax incomes in a double auction market just like the one described in subsection 2.1. 
However, in this game the tax rate is no longer exogenously given. Instead, when the market 
opens it is public information that t is endogenously determined in the tax competition and 
election stages. In the tax competition stage, the ten citizens and two candidates, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵, 
observe all pre-tax incomes in the market. Then, the candidates independently choose 
binding tax rates, 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 ∈ [0,1],  which are simultaneously announced to the society. In the 
election stage, the two tax rates, 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴  and  𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵,  compete in a simple majority election (with 
random tie breaking) where all citizens independently and simultaneously vote either for 
candidate  𝐴𝐴 or for candidate 𝐵𝐵 (abstention is not an option and voting is costless). The 
winning candidate, w, receives a payoff of 𝜎𝜎𝑤𝑤 = 25 points and her tax rate, 𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤, determines 
the income redistribution among citizens (as in subsection 2.1). The losing candidate, 
−𝑤𝑤 ≠ 𝑤𝑤,  receives a payoff of 𝜎𝜎−𝑤𝑤 = 15  points and her tax rate is of no consequence. 
Moreover, each citizen 𝑖𝑖’s final payoff (i.e., after-tax market income) is given by 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 +
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 (as in subsection 2.1). 
2.3 Markets with lobbying and endogenous redistributive taxation 
This game has four decision-making stages. The only difference with the game described in 
subsection 2.2 is that a ‘lobbying’ stage is added in-between the market and tax competition 
stages. In the lobbying stage, all citizens have the opportunity to transfer  points  to the 
candidates. Specifically, they independently choose and simultaneously submit a pair of 
lobbying transfers (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖→𝐴𝐴,𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖→𝐵𝐵), where 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗 denotes the amount sent by citizen 𝑖𝑖 to candidate 𝑗𝑗 9 
and 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖→𝐴𝐴 + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖→𝐵𝐵 denotes 𝑖𝑖’s total amount sent. Any pair of lobbying transfers is feasible, 
with the only restriction that 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖].  Importantly, these transfers do not change the 
decision space of citizens or candidates in the next stages. In particular, candidates have no 
obligation towards citizens who transfer points. Then, each citizen 𝑖𝑖’s final payoff is given by 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ,𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙 ≡ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖, implying that transfers are not tax deductible. Each candidate 𝑗𝑗’s 
payoff is given by 𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≡ 𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗 + 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗, where 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≡ ∑ 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖→𝑗𝑗
10
𝑖𝑖=1  denotes the sum of transfers that 𝑗𝑗 
receives from all citizens. 
3. Theoretical predictions 
Here, we present theoretical predictions for our games. 
3.1 Markets with exogenous redistributive taxation 
In this subsection, we derive predictions for the double auction market with exogenous 
redistributive taxation. We first conduct a static  analysis, and examine dynamic  market 
behavior thereafter. For our static analysis, we use the intersection of market supply and 
demand curves to determine equilibrium quantities and prices (see Figure 1). This gives our 
first prediction: 
Prediction 1  (Static market equilibrium):  Independent of redistributive taxation, 
𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,1], any market equilibrium is efficient (that is, yields maximum possible welfare 
of 238 points) and involves 𝑞𝑞∗ = 7 transactions at any market price 𝑝𝑝∗ ∈ {48,…,52}. 
Compared to the average equilibrium income of 23.8 points, prior to redistribution, this 
results in a rich minority of four citizens with above-average income (citizens S1, S2, 
B1, and B2) and a poor majority of six citizens with below-average income (citizens S3, 
S4, S5, B3, B4, and B5).9
                                                             
9 For example, using the median equilibrium market price, 𝑝𝑝∗ = 50, yields the following income distribution: 52, 
46, 40, and 34 points for the rich citizens B2, S2, B1, and S1, and 17, 14, 12, 10, 7, and 6 points for the poor 
citizens B3, S3, B4, S4, B5, and S5. 
 10 
This follows directly from Figure 1. A maximum possible welfare or aggregate income10
 
 of 
238 points implies that sellers S1 and S2 and buyers B1 and B2 each trade their first and 
second units, and sellers S3, S4, and S5 and buyers B3, B4, and B5 each trade their first units 
(henceforth, we refer to these units as ‘efficient units’ and to the remaining units as 
‘inefficient units’). Moreover, in equilibrium, the average income per unit is 11.9 (=238/20) 
points.  Depending on the equilibrium market price, eight or nine out of twenty units 
(fourteen efficient units) earn more than average and hence are taxed (see Figure 1), while 
all other units receive taxes. Notably, because redistributive taxes are calculated as a 
percentage of market income, in our static analysis there are no inward shifts in the supply 
and demand curves—hence, no deadweight losses (cf. Rosen and Gayer 2007; Ruffle 2005). 
We now analyze dynamic market behavior. Compared to the benchmark of maximum 
possible welfare, there are two sources of market inefficiency. First, inefficiencies arise if a 
transaction matches an inefficient unit with an efficient unit from the ‘other side’ of the 
market. For example, an inefficient trade occurs if seller S1 posts a price of 35 points for her 
first unit, and buyer B3 accepts this price for her second unit. Second, inefficiencies arise if 
an efficient unit is not traded within the market period. At one extreme, if no one trades any 
units, the market generates zero welfare (or 0% efficiency) and, at the other extreme, if 
everyone trades all of their units, the market produces welfare of 193 points (or 81.1% 
efficiency).11
                                                             
10 We use the terms ‘welfare’ and ‘aggregate income’ synonymous throughout the paper. Moreover, we say that 
the market is efficient if it yields maximum possible welfare; the degree of efficiency in percentage is calculated as 
(actual welfare ⁄ maximum possible welfare) × 100. 
 
11 Note that any transaction increases welfare, but only trading paths that include all efficient units and no 
inefficient units yield 100% efficiency. Moreover, two of the standard trading rules already limit the possibility of 
inefficiencies. First, no transaction can match two inefficient units because of the requirement that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for 
sellers and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for buyers. Second, each trader must first trade her first unit (which contributes more to 
welfare than the second unit). Note that we conjecture subjects would obey both rules even if not made explicit. 11 
Next, we discuss in turn the cases without and with redistributive taxation. Typically, 
experimental double auction markets where 𝑡𝑡 = 0 yield efficiencies very close to 100% (e.g., 
Davis and Holt 1993; Kagel and Roth 1995). What kind of market behavior avoids  the 
inefficiencies described above? The most important trading pattern in this respect is that 
sellers (buyers) start posting prices from above (below) the equilibrium price range, and 
adjust prices downwards (upwards) if no match with the other side of the market is found. 
In this way, only efficient units can be traded—roughly at equilibrium prices, if sellers and 
buyers seek as high as possible market incomes.12 However, recall that they are not informed 
about others’ costs and values, from which they could derive the equilibrium price range, 
and hence must rely on their subjective beliefs about this range. Nonetheless, if they post 
prices ‘aggressively’—that is, well above costs for sellers and well below values for buyers—
and make adjustments in small steps, inefficiencies can be substantially avoided. Moreover, 
note that if pricing is monotonic—that is, lower-cost units are priced lower than higher-cost 
units and higher-value units are priced higher than lower-value units—welfare is further 
promoted because efficient units are more likely to be traded early and, hence, inefficient 
transactions are less likely. Indeed, aggressive and monotonic posting of prices has been 
observed in experiments (e.g., Smith 1962; Davis and Holt 1993; Kagel and Roth 1998) and, 
therefore, we expect the same for our double auction market without redistributive 
taxation.13
Does market behavior change in the presence of redistributive taxation? If rational 
traders expect tax rates to be strictly positive, 𝑡𝑡 > 0, then a seller’s minimum willingness to 
accept may exceed her respective unit’s cost and a buyer’s maximum willingness to pay may 
be smaller than her respective unit’s value. As a consequence, the supply and demand curves 
shown in Figure 1 may shift inwards—at least temporarily—and sellers and buyers may post 
 
                                                             
12 That is, unless there are so few acceptances that sellers and buyers end up adjusting their prices below and 
above the equilibrium price range. 
13 In some experimental double auction markets, transaction prices tend to come from above or below the market 
price (range). We conjecture one of the reasons to be subjective beliefs about others’ costs and values, which may 
vary for sellers and buyers and across different shapes of supply and demand curves. 12 
prices more aggressively than when there is no redistribution. This is because they take into 
account the possibility that their own transaction may prohibit the transaction of more 
welfare-enhancing, lower-cost and higher-value units by others (for a detailed analysis, see 
Appendix A). Specifically, the after-tax market incomes of sellers and buyers consist of a 
‘private’ component—that is, the non-taxed part of their market incomes—and a ‘welfare’ 
component received from redistribution. At one extreme, if 𝑡𝑡 = 0, then they always have an 
incentive to trade both of their units, because this increases their market incomes. At the 
other extreme, if 𝑡𝑡 = 1, then they only have an incentive to trade efficient units—at any 
feasible price—but never inefficient units (of course, in our setup sellers and buyers must 
form subjective beliefs about whether or not they possess efficient units). Note the important 
tradeoff: although trading an inefficient unit always increases a trader’s private component, 
this—depending on the tax rate—may be outweighed by a decrease in her welfare 
component, if an efficient unit that is sufficiently welfare-enhancing can no longer be traded. 
Precisely for the reason of covering this potential loss from trading, they may demand a ‘risk 
premium’—that  is, increase their minimum willingness to accept and decrease their 
maximum willingness to pay. Hence, risk premiums yield inward shifts in the supply and 
demand curves.14
                                                             
14 In principle, the supply and demand curves may also shift outwards. However, this is excluded by our trading 
rule that units must not be sold below costs and bought above values. 
 Because the importance of the welfare component relative to the private 
component increases in the tax rate, a higher t  should result in stronger inward shifts. 
Moreover, if the sellers’ (buyers’) beliefs about their own costs (values) compared to those of 
others are monotonic—that is, preserve the ranking of actual costs (values) in the market—
these shifts should be stronger for units with larger costs (smaller values). The next 
prediction summarizes our arguments: 13 
Prediction 2 (Market dynamics):  Posted prices are at least as aggressive for higher 
than for lower tax rates, t (that is, sellers and buyers tend to post higher and lower 
prices, respectively, if tax rates are higher). If beliefs about their own costs and values 
relative to those of others are monotonic (that is, preserving the ranking of actual costs 
and values in the market), then this tendency is stronger for higher-cost sellers and 
lower-value buyers. 
3.2 Tax competition and voting 
Under the assumption that Prediction 1 holds—in particular, that there is a rich minority 
and a poor majority prior to taxation—we can simplify our analysis and derive subgame 
perfect equilibria for  the tax competition and election stages. As a refinement, we use 
iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. We first analyze the voting stage and, 
thereafter, the tax competition stage. 
Prediction 3  (Subgame perfect equilibrium for endogenous taxation without 
lobbying):  If Prediction 1 holds, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in 
weakly dominant strategies of the tax competition and election stages, in which both 
candidates choose full redistribution, 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴
∗ = 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵
∗ = 1 and all citizens randomize their vote 
between the two candidates.15
Proof:  We use iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Then, in the voting 
stage,  each citizen votes sincerely for her preferred candidate: if 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 < 𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗  the four rich 
citizens vote for 𝑗𝑗 and the six poor citizens vote for –𝑗𝑗, and if 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 = 𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 all citizens randomize 
their votes between the two candidates. This is because voting sincerely yields citizen 𝑖𝑖 a 
 
                                                             
15 In elections with two distinct alternatives and compulsory, simple majority voting, there is a unique Nash 
equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies where everyone votes sincerely for her preferred alternative and, 
hence, the majority wins. Allowing for insincere voting (dramatically) increases the number of Nash equilibria 
where both majorities and minorities can win. In experiments, relatively few insincere votes are observed (e.g., 
McKelvey and Ordeshook 1990). If voting is costly, majorities win more often and the likelihood increases in the 
difference between the sizes of the majority and minority (see Großer and Schram 2009; Levine and Palfrey 
2007). 14 
higher payoff than voting insincerely in cases where her vote is pivotal (that is, when there 
are four votes for one candidate and five votes for the other candidate by the nine other 
citizens), and her payoff does not depend on her vote in all other, non-pivotal cases. Thus, 
voting sincerely weakly dominates voting insincerely. Each candidate anticipates the 
citizens’ equilibrium decisions in the voting stage. Then, in the tax competition stage the two 
candidates choose 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴
∗ = 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵
∗ = 1. This tax rate weakly dominates any lower tax rate 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
′ < 1, 
because 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
′ yields the same payoff for 𝑗𝑗 as 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
∗ if 𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 < 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
′; a lower expected payoff than 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
∗ if 
𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 = 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
′; and a lower payoff than 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
∗ if 𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 > 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
′∎ 
3.3 Lobbying 
Next, we analyze our game with lobbying. We derive the following prediction. 
Prediction 4 (Subgame perfect equilibrium for endogenous taxation with lobbying):  
If Prediction 1 holds, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly 
dominant strategies of the lobbying, tax competition, and election stages, in which no 
citizen transfers any money amount to the two candidates, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
∗ = 0  for all 𝑖𝑖,  both 
candidates choose full redistribution, 𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴
∗ = 𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵
∗ = 1, and all citizens randomize their vote 
between the two candidates. 
Proof:  Building on the proof of Prediction 3, citizens anticipate the equilibrium decisions in 
the tax competition and voting stages, which are independent of any (nonbinding) transfers 
by citizens, (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖→𝐴𝐴,𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖→𝐵𝐵).  Thus, lobbying only decreases a citizen’s payoff and all 𝑖𝑖  choose 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖
∗ = 0∎ 
3.4 Alternative predictions 
A variety of ‘behavioral’ influences may affect our previous predictions. Hence, we briefly 
discuss some plausible alternative predictions.  
First, many experiments have shown that decisions are prone to systematic mistakes—
that is, are stochastic with more lucrative decisions being made more often (as in the quantal 
response equilibrium of McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998). As a consequence, to some 
extent, we anticipate deviations from our Predictions 1, 3, and 4. For example, candidates 15 
may not always choose tax rates of one and voters may not always vote sincerely (and more 
so for smaller differences in both tax rates).  
Second, there is a bulk of evidence that payoff dominant outcomes and marginal 
incentives matter for decision making in ways not explained by Nash equilibrium (e.g., Isaac 
and Walker 1988). For example, in our double auction market with redistributive taxation, 
two decisions need to be distinguished: the decisions on whether or not to trade, and if yes, 
on pricing. The marginal income of a traded unit is decreasing in the tax rate by a factor 
𝑡𝑡 ×
𝑛𝑛−1
𝑛𝑛  if it earns more than average, and it is increasing by this factor if it earns less than 
average.16 This may result in less pricing effort for above-income units when higher tax rates 
are anticipated, potentially spurring transaction and price volatility that result in 
inefficiencies. By contrast, the marginal incentive to trade an efficient (inefficient) unit is 
increasing (decreasing) in the tax rate, which promotes efficiency. Moreover, candidates 
have constant marginal incentives (i.e., 10 points) to win the elections. However, citizens can 
manipulate these incentives through lobbying—that is, they  can shoulder some of the 
candidates’ risks from moving away from zero-tax rates by transferring money to them. In 
this respect, the success of lobbying depends on whether or not the rich minority can 
provide candidates with sufficiently high incentives to deviate in their favor, in spite of 
potential counteractive lobbying of the poor. Note that if both candidates manage to 
coordinate on the same lower tax rates, they and the rich can achieve payoff dominant 
incomes, on average.17
Third, fairness concerns play an important role in many decision making situations 
(e.g., as in models of social preferences or inequality aversion; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, 
Fehr and Schmidt 1999). A particularly drastic influence of fairness concerns may occur in 
the double auction market, if the rich abstain from trading their efficient units in order to 
  
                                                             
16  Citizen 𝑖𝑖’s after-tax income is given by 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡(𝜋𝜋 � − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡�
𝑛𝑛−1
𝑛𝑛 𝜋𝜋 �−𝑖𝑖 +
1
𝑛𝑛𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖� = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡 ×
𝑛𝑛−1
𝑛𝑛 (𝜋𝜋 �−𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖), where 𝜋𝜋 �−𝑖𝑖 denotes the average pre-tax income of all citizens other than 𝑖𝑖. Then, 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑡𝑡 ×
𝑛𝑛−1
𝑛𝑛  
if 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 > 𝜋𝜋 �−𝑖𝑖; 1 + 𝑡𝑡 ×
𝑛𝑛−1
𝑛𝑛  if 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 < 𝜋𝜋 �−𝑖𝑖; and 1 if 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋 �−𝑖𝑖. 
17 For example, the collusion of the candidates and the rich may be triggered by reciprocity (e.g., Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). 16 
punish high tax rates—for example, because of spitefulness (Levine 1998) or because they 
feel entitled to higher shares of the welfare (Bosman and van Winden 2002). As another 
example, in elections full redistribution (see our Predictions 3 and 4) may be reinforced if 
some inequality-averse rich citizens vote for higher tax rates, alongside with the poor. 
Obviously, many of the ‘behavioral’ influences are interactive, giving the same or 
opposing incentives. Admittedly, distinguishing these influences in our experiment seems to 
be a difficult task. However, it is nonetheless important to understand why potential 
deviations from our Predictions 1 to 4 may occur, and if substantial, to elaborate further on 
our alternative predictions. 
4. Experimental design 
The computerized experiment was run at the Economics Laboratory of the University of 
Cologne.18
In each session, the 20 or 24 subjects were randomly divided into two societies of ten 
citizens or ten citizens and two candidates. There was no interaction of any kind between 
subjects in different societies, and this was public information. Given that we do not know 
the structure of the correlations across observations, we treat the society as the independent 
unit of observation, unless otherwise noted. Hence, each session provides us with two 
independent observations. 
 136 students participated in 6 sessions of 20 or 24 subjects. Each session lasted 
about two hours (see the online appendix for instructions). Subjects earned an average of 
€27.00, which included a show-up fee of €2.50. 
The experiment consisted of four treatments, all of which started with a computerized 
double auction market. They varied with respect to whether redistributive taxes were 
determined exogenously or endogenously and whether or not lobbying was allowed. Market-
0 and Market-1 used exogenous tax rates of 0 and 1, respectively (see subsection 2.1); No 
Lobbying used endogenous tax rates through tax competition and elections (see subsection 
2.2); and Lobbying used endogenous tax rates and, in addition, provided citizens with the 
                                                             
18 We used z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) for programming the experimental software and ORSEE (Greiner 2004) for 
recruiting subjects. 17 
opportunity to transfer money amounts to the candidates prior to tax policy choices (see 
subsection  2.3). In a within-subjects design, we compare Market-0 to Market-1 and No 
Lobbying to Lobbying, where 10 periods of one treatment were followed by 10 periods of the 
other treatment (to control for order effects, we reversed the sequence of both treatments 
across sessions). At the beginning of each session, subjects were informed that there will be 
two parts with 10 periods each, but they were not given the instructions for the second part 
until the first part had finished. To some extent, depending on the observed tax rates in No 
Lobbying and Lobbying, we can also make comparisons between subjects for these two 
treatments and Market-0 and Market-1. 
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned the roles of sellers 
and buyers (and of two candidates in No Lobbying and Lobbying) and the costs and values of 
their two units of the good (see Figure 1). None of these assignments changed during the 
entire session, and subjects were informed about this. In each of the 2 × 10 periods, the 
market was open for 2 minutes.19
                                                             
19 To familiarize subjects with the trading rules and software, we conducted three unpaid double auction markets 
before the first part started. 
 Finally, it was public information that everyone in the 
society will be fully informed of: each citizen’s pre-tax and after-tax market income; in the 
Lobbying treatment, each citizen’s money transfers to the two candidates; each candidate’s 
tax rate; and their vote tallies in the elections. Note that the identities of specific citizens and 
candidates were never revealed to other subjects. Table 1 summarizes our treatments and 
parameters. 
Table 1 – Summary of treatments and parameters 
Treatment  Sellers/Buyers/Candidates  Tax rate  Lobbying  # societies 
Market-0  5/5/0 per society  0  No  4 
Market-1  5/5/0 per society  1  No  4 
No Lobbying  5/5/2 per society  endogenous  No  8 
Lobbying  5/5/2 per society  endogenous  Yes  8 
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5. Experimental results 
The presentation and analysis of our data is organized as follows. We begin by analyzing 
observed pre- and after-tax market earnings (subsection 5.1). Thereafter, we examine in 
more detail market behavior (5.2), efficiency (5.3), lobbying behavior (5.4), and finally, 
voting and candidate behavior (5.5). Where appropriate, we confront the results with our 
theoretical and alternative predictions. 
5.1 Pre- and after-tax market earnings 
Figure 2 shows observed mean pre- and after-tax market earnings for each treatment and 
seller and buyer type.20 For comparison, it also gives the pre-tax earnings (× signs) and after-
tax earnings (+ signs) derived from our Predictions 1, 3, and 4.21
In all treatments, the observed mean levels and distributions of pre-tax earnings are 
very similar to those in Prediction 1 (compare the × signs and the light blue bars in Figure 2). 
As a consequence, in almost every period there is a rich minority of four subjects and a poor 
majority of six subjects (100.0% of all cases in Market-0; 95.00% in Market-1; 98.75% in No 
Lobbying; and 97.50% in Lobbying). Moreover, in line with Predictions 3 and 4, virtually full 
egalitarian after-tax market earnings are not only observed in Market-1 but also in our No 
Lobbying and Lobbying treatments (compare the + signs and the dark  green bars). This 
gives: 
 
Experimental result 1 (Earnings distributions):  In all treatments, market earnings 
generate a rich minority and a poor majority. When redistribution is endogenous, 
welfare is virtually fully egalitarian. 
Figure 2 also indicates that the number of transactions and their prices must be 
roughly determined by the intersection of the induced demand and supply curves (see 
Prediction 1 and Figure 1) and that the winning tax rates in the No Lobbying and Lobbying 
                                                             
20 The after-tax market earnings in the Lobbying treatment include transfers to candidates and, hence, are not the 
final earnings of traders. 
21 We calculated the predicted pre-tax earnings using the median equilibrium price of 50 points. 19 
treatments must be very close to one (see Predictions 3 and 4). Notably, the dramatic 
redistribution does not markedly decrease efficiency: realized mean earnings are generally 
only slightly lower than in the efficient market equilibrium. Below, we discuss the 
observations from Figure 2 in more detail. 
5.2 Market behavior 
Market outcomes are summarized in Figure 3. For each treatment and period it shows: the 
mean number of transactions (right-hand axis), the mean transaction price (left-hand axis), 
and the mean market efficiency in percentage (see footnote 10; also left-hand axis). The 
vertical bars correspond to one standard deviation above and below the respective mean 
(periods with no vertical bars are due to no variation). Table 2 provides further statistics, 
 
Figure 2 – Pre- and after-tax market earnings 
Note: The figure shows, for each treatment, the pre- and after-tax market earnings for each buyer type (B1,…, 
B5) and seller type (S1,…, S5). It also gives the pre-  and after-tax earnings derived  using equilibrium 
quantities, prices, and tax rates of 𝑞𝑞∗ = 7, 𝑝𝑝∗ = 50, and 𝑡𝑡∗ = 1 (𝑡𝑡 = 0 in Market-0, where pre- and after-tax 
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Sellers' and buyers' type20 
including the mean ask-bid spread, that is, the difference in posted prices of sellers (‘asks’) 
and buyers (‘bids’). 
In all treatments, the observed mean numbers of transactions are very close to the 
market equilibrium of 𝑞𝑞∗ = 7 and quite stable across periods (see Prediction 1 and Figure 3). 
Statistically, averaged over all periods, they are with 7.03, 7.15, and 6.98 not significantly 
different from seven in Market-0, Market-1, and No Lobbying (𝑝𝑝 > 0.36; see Table 2).22
                                                             
22  Unless otherwise noted, we throughout test treatment effects by comparing the coefficients of treatment 
dummy variables, which are estimated using OLS regressions and robust standard errors (White, 1980). As 
mentioned earlier, we use society as the unit of independent observation and apply society random effects to 
control for unobservable characteristics. For variables that are calculated every period, such as market 
transactions, we control for potential time trends and order effects by including unconditional period fixed 
effects. For variables that are calculated every 10 periods (i.e. every part), such as the mean standard deviation of 
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Figure 3 – Double auction markets 
Notes: The figure shows, for each period per treatment, the mean number of transactions (red), mean 
transaction price (black), and mean efficiency (light blue; measured as realized market earnings as a 
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Lobbying, the mean number of transactions is with 6.88 weakly significantly lower than 
seven (𝑝𝑝 = 0.08), but the observed difference is very small. Moreover, we do not find 
significant differences in mean standard deviations between any of the treatments (𝑝𝑝 > 0.19; 
see Table 2).23
Figure 3 also shows that the observed mean transaction prices all fall within the 
equilibrium price range of [48, 52] points (see Prediction 1). However, it also reveals some 
differences in price volatility across treatments. This can be seen more clearly when looking 
at the mean standard deviations in prices in Table 2.
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the number of transactions, we also include part dummy variables. This approach allows us to fully exploit the 
panel structure of our data. 
 Price volatility is, with a standard 
deviation of 2.42,  lowest in Market-0, followed by 3.72, 4.91, and 5.62 in Lobbying, No 
Lobbying, and Market-1. Statistically, while the standard deviations are not significantly 
23 We calculated the standard deviation in the number of transactions across the ten market periods for each 
society, and then took the mean of the standard deviations across societies per treatment. 
24 We calculated the standard deviation in prices for each market period per society, and then took the mean 
across all periods and societies per treatment. 
Table 2 – Market outcomes 
  Market-0  Market-1  No lobbying  Lobbying  Zero intelligence 
# of transactions           
Mean  7.03  7.15  6.98  6.88  6.97 
Std. dev.  0.31  0.40  0.37  0.45  0.89 
% equal to 7  87.50%  77.50%  80.00%  75.00%  50.84% 
Price           
Mean  49.04  50.58  50.16  50.08  51.17 
Std. dev.  2.42  5.62  4.91  3.72  12.97 
% in [48, 52]  69.78%  55.21%  49.43%  51.26%  17.45% 
Ask-bid spread           
Mean  10.92  15.01  12.98  11.88  10.41 
Std. dev.  4.55  4.51  6.57  4.47  4.13 
Efficiency           
Mean  98.81  97.04  97.21  96.89  92.74 
Std. dev.  2.42  3.33  3.07  4.53  8.06 
% equal to 100  75.00%  47.50%  55.00%  57.50%  20.47% 
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different from each other in Market-1 and No Lobbying (𝑝𝑝 = 0.51), for both treatments they 
are significantly higher than in Market-0 (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01) and weakly significantly higher than in 
Lobbying (𝑝𝑝 < 0.07). Moreover, the standard deviation in Lobbying is weakly significantly 
higher than the one in Market-0 (𝑝𝑝 = 0.09). 
Interestingly, and consistent with Prediction 2, we do see differences in posted prices 
between treatments. Table 2 shows a larger spread between mean asks and bids in Market-1 
than in Market-0 (15.01 vs. 10.92; the difference is statistically significant, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01). Hence, 
subjects do indeed trade more aggressively with full redistribution than with zero-tax rates. 
Moreover, though the ask-bid spread is also higher in No Lobbying and Lobbying than in 
Market-0, the differences are not significant (12.98 and 11.88 vs. 10.92; 𝑝𝑝 > 0.24).25
 We further test these results by examining who exactly causes the increased 
difference in posted prices between both sides of the market in Market-1  compared to 
Market-0. To do so, we utilize the within-subject design between these two treatments to run 
regressions with mean asks or mean  bids as the  dependent variables.    As independent 




                                                             
25 Compared to Market-1, the ask-bid spread is weakly significantly different in Lobbying (𝑝𝑝 = 0.08) but not in No 
Lobbying (𝑝𝑝 = 0.29). 
 As one would expect, there is a strong positive relationship between asks 
and the cost of the unit (𝑝𝑝 = 0.01) and bids and the value of the unit (𝑝𝑝 = 0.01). Comparing 
Market-0 and Market-1, we find that asks are significantly higher in Market-1 for units with 
costs greater than 18 points—the lowest cost in the market—(Wald tests, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.02) and that 
bids are significantly lower in Market-1 for units with values smaller than 67 points—the 
fourth highest value in the market—(Wald tests, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05). Thus, the observed higher ask-
bid spread in Market-1 is due to some buyers systematically bidding less and some sellers 
systematically biding more compared to when there is no redistribution, which is consistent 
with our Prediction 2. Moreover, also consistent with Prediction 2 is the observation that the 
26 In each society, mean asks and bids were calculated for each period and unit (10 seller and 10 buyer units). We 
ran a separate OLS regression for sellers and buyers. Given that costs and values almost identify specific subjects 
in a society, we used subject random effects and include unconditional period and society fixed effects. 23 
treatment difference occurs for goods that are more likely to produce an efficiency loss (i.e., 
units with low values or high costs). 
Although the higher ask-bid spread observed in Market-1 compared to Market-0 is in 
line with our Prediction 2, it could be argued that that is the result of subjects trading more 
carelessly due to lower marginal incentives from trading (see our alternative predictions in 
subsection 3.4). To better evaluate the degree to which this  is a consequence of noisy 
decision making, we provide a random benchmark in the next subsection. 
We find little support for other alternative predictions. In particular, we do not see 
evidence of rich subjects abstaining from trading when highly taxed (e.g., because of 
spitefulness). For example, in Market-1 the four rich subjects trade 99.39% of the six units 
that have an important impact on efficiency—that is, the three lowest cost and three highest 
value units, which in equilibrium account for 70.59% of all market earnings and 97.67% of 
the rich’s pre-tax earnings. This percentage does not look much different in No Lobbying and 
Lobbying, where the rich trade 98.13% and 96.88% of their six most efficient units (for 
comparison, in Market-0 they trade 98.75% of these units). 
The following result summarizes our findings from this subsection: 
Experimental result 2 (Market behavior):  Market behavior is generally quite similar 
across treatments, but price volatility and ask-bid spreads are markedly higher with 
exogenous full redistribution. 
5.3 Zero-intelligence trading 
In the previous subsections, we have shown that—in spite of drastically different tax rates 
across treatments—observed mean market outcomes are roughly consistent with our 
Prediction 1. To what extent can this strong result be attributed to the ‘double auction 
market’ mechanism itself, and to  what extent to the market behavior of subjects? In 
particular, Gode and Sunder (1993) argue that the trading rules of the double auction market 
yield near-equilibrium outcomes even with ’zero-intelligence’ traders—that is, robots that 
randomly post and accept prices within the bounds of the rules. In this sense, it is interesting 
to compare our predictions and experimental results with a zero-intelligence benchmark. If 24 
high tax rates induce subjects  to trade carelessly and this translates to more random 
behavior, then the subjects’ behavior in Market-1 should be similar to that of robot traders. 
To perform this comparison, we follow Gode and Sunder (1993) and run simulations using 
our specific parameters and trading rules (see Appendix B for a more detailed description of 
the procedures). For example, we use the same number of sellers and buyers and the same 
distribution of costs and values as shown in Figure 1. The results of our simulations are 
presented in the last column of Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that even though robot traders post and accept prices randomly, the 
mean number of transactions is practically equal to the equilibrium number of seven, and 
the mean price of 51.17 falls within the equilibrium range of [48, 52] points. However, robot 
traders produce much higher price volatility than our subjects (i.e., a standard deviation of 
12.97 vs. 5.52, 4.91, 3.72, and 2.42 in Market-1, No Lobbying, Lobbying, and Market-0). As a 
consequence, only 17.45% of transactions in our simulations are actually made at 
equilibrium prices (as compared to 69.78% in Market-0 and around half in the other 
treatments). Compared to prices, the number or transactions look more similar between 
robots and subjects, although once again, they tend to vary more for the zero-intelligence 
traders. Moreover, Table 2 shows that our simulations with robot traders yield a mean ask-
bid spread of around the same magnitude as Market-0 does. Both spreads are the lowest 
(10.41 and 10.92), followed by 11.88, 12.98, and 15.01 in Lobbying, No Lobbying, and 
Market-1. In summary, while robot pricing yields substantially higher price volatility than in 
our four treatments, differences in volatilities are more moderate with respect to the 
number of transactions and ask-bid spreads. 
The most important differences in market behavior observed between our 
experimental treatments are the higher price volatility and ask-bid spread in Market-1. The 
zero-intelligence simulation results suggest that the higher ask-bid spread is not due to 
random posting of prices, but to a systematic change in market behavior—the largest 
difference in spread is with 4.60 (4.09) points found between Market-1 and our simulations 
(Market-0). In light of our simulation results, what are the consequences of the higher ask-
bid spread in Market-1? We conjecture that the more aggressive posting of prices prevents 25 
even higher price volatility, as the one produced by robot traders. Note that similar things as 
for Market-1 seem to hold for Lobbying, though to a smaller extent. Moreover, from 
comparing price volatility and ask-bid spreads between our No Lobbying and Lobbying 
treatments, we also conjecture that lobbying may have a small influence on decreasing the 
mean ask-bid spread (12.98 vs. 11.88) and, in this way, decrease price volatility (4.91 vs. 
3.72 standard deviations). 
5.4 Efficiency 
The highest mean market efficiency is observed in Market-0 where subjects achieve 98.81% 
of the maximum earnings (see Table 2). At around 97%, efficiency is almost two percentage 
points lower in the three other treatments. If we test for statistical differences, we observe 
that the mean efficiency in Market-0 is significantly higher than in Market-1 (𝑝𝑝 = 0.01), but 
we do not find a significant result for the other comparisons (𝑝𝑝 > 0.25). Importantly, double 
auction markets in our experimental treatments are between four to six percentage points 
more efficient than in the zero-intelligence simulations, which have a mean efficiency of 
92.74%. Hence, exogenously increasing tax rates from zero to one seems to negatively affect 
market efficiency (compare Market-1 and Market-0). However, full redistribution does not 
destroy all market incentives, as evidenced by a substantially higher efficiency in Market-1 
compared to the simulations with robot traders who randomly post and accept prices. This 
gives: 
Experimental result 3 (Efficiency):  Market efficiency ranges from 97 to 99% and is 
highest without redistribution. In all treatments, efficiency is between 4 to 6 percentage 
points higher than in our simulations with robot traders that post and accept prices 
randomly. 
5.5 Lobbying 
Figure 4 gives for each period in our Lobbying treatment the observed mean lobbying 
transfers of citizens in points per candidate (left panel) and per citizen (right panel), 
distinguishing between transfers from the rich and poor subjects. There are  substantial 
transfers in the first period, where each candidate receives an average of 12.00 and 4.81 26 
points from the rich and poor. However, transfers drop sharply in the second period, and 
continue to decrease until each candidate receives approximately a total of two points per 
period from around the fifth period onward. Accordingly, while lobbying behavior does not 
initially conform to the predicted zero transfers, it is not too far off in later periods (see 
Prediction 4). Note that the percentage of welfare spent on money transfers in our 
experiment is very low, which also holds for the percentage of GDP spent on lobbying in the 
United States.   
In Table 3, we examine whether there is support for our alternative prediction that 
candidates respond to lobbying transfers by citizens. It shows that the mean tax rate chosen 
by the candidates does indeed depend on the difference of transfers between the rich and 
the poor. When this difference is zero or negative (i.e., the rich lobby on average less than the 
poor), mean tax rates are very high. By contrast, when the difference is positive (i.e., the rich 
transfer on average more than the poor), mean tax rates decrease by about twenty 
percentage points. This negative relationship is statistically significant (Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌 = −0.36, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.01). 
But if candidates respond to lobbying, it is  reasonable to ask why do we observe 
virtually full redistribution  (see Figure 2)? The main reason is that rich subjects do not 
consistently transfer more points to the candidates than the poor subjects do. Recall that, if 
both candidates have the same probability of winning, each candidate has expected earnings 
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of 20 points. It follows that  a transfer of at least 5 points is needed to compensate a 
candidate for choosing a tax rate smaller than one and putting herself at risk of losing the 
election. Hence, intuitively, the rich need to outspend the poor by at least 5 points per 
candidate. However, cases in which there is a 5-point difference in transfers between rich 
and poor are rarely observed in our Lobbying treatment, seemingly due to miscoordination 
among rich citizens. In total, there are 44 out of 80 cases in which at least one candidate 
receives some money from the rich and only 28 cases where both candidates get something. 
Of these 28 cases, there are only 4 cases where both candidates receive 5 points or more 
from rich citizens than from poor citizens (all 4 cases occurred in the first period). 
Statistically, only in the first period do rich citizens transfer significantly more than poor 
citizens (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.02 in period 1, else 𝑝𝑝 > 0.16), but even in this 
period the difference in transfers is  not significantly different from 5 points (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.26). 
There is also miscoordination among the candidates: 39 out of 80 tax rates are lower 
than the predicted tax rate of one (see Prediction 4). But only 12 of these cases occur in the 
same period. As a result, although we observe a substantial number of deviations from the 
predicted tax rate—in part due to lobbying and candidate responses to it—the winning tax 
rates are very often close to or equal to one. This is discussed in more detail in the next 
subsection. 
We summarize the findings of this subsection in our next result: 
Table 3 – Effect of lobbying on tax rates 
  Transfers from rich citizens minus transfers from poor citizens 
  –5 or less  (–5 , 0)  0  (0 , 5)  5 or more 
Mean tax rate  0.95  0.94  0.93  0.70  0.77 
Standard deviation  0.08  0.16  0.20  0.39  0.28 
Frequency  5.63%  28.13%  35.00%  20.00%  11.25% 
 28 
Experimental result 4 (Lobbying):  There is substantial lobbying by the rich and 
counteractive lobbying by the poor at the beginning, but thereafter only small amounts 
are transferred to the candidates. Candidates choose on average about 20% lower tax 
rates when they receive more money from the rich than from the poor. 
5.6 Elections 
Figure 5 shows for each period in our No Lobbying and Lobbying treatments: the chosen tax 
rates weighted by their relative frequency (circles), the mean winning and losing tax rates 
(dark green and light blue lines), and the proportion of insincere votes (bars)—that is, votes 
that are contrary to a voter’s pecuniary interest. 
In both treatments, consistent with our Predictions 3 and 4, the observed modal tax 
rate is one. Full redistribution policies are chosen 65.62% and 68.13% of the time in No 
Lobbying and Lobbying, which results in mean winning tax rates of 0.90 and 0.95 (the 
winning tax rates are not significantly different between the two treatments and the same 
holds  for the chosen tax rates;  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests, 𝑝𝑝 > 0.13). Moreover, we 
 
Figure 5: Elections 
Note: The figure shows, for each period and treatment, the chosen tax rates (weighted by their relative 
frequency; circles), the mean winning and losing tax rates (dark green and light blue lines), and the fraction 
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observe only a few insincere votes: overall, 3.38% of all votes in No Lobbying and 2.50% in 
Lobbying (the difference between the two percentages is not significant; Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.33). Interestingly, insincere voting is significantly more common among 
rich than poor subjects—possibly due to fairness concerns, although the difference in 
magnitude is still small (4.79% vs. 1.64%; Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.01)—and, 
hence, contributes to the observation that higher tax rates almost always win. This result 
combined with our finding that the rich’s lobbying attempts are not successful (see 
subsection 5.5) essentially means that money transfers constitute a pure redistribution from 
citizens to candidates (as in, Bernheim and Whinston 1986; Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 
1997). 
We have arrived at our final result: 
Experimental result 5 (Elections):  In the treatments with endogenous redistribution, 
the mean winning tax rates are with 0.90 and 0.95 very high and citizens vote almost 
always sincerely. 
5. Conclusions 
We experimentally study how markets and elections interact, and in particular, how their 
interaction affects the generation and distribution of welfare. Based on the observation that 
all democracies around the world have a majority of citizens with pre-tax incomes below the 
average national income, we use a double auction market where, in equilibrium, market 
outcomes generate a rich minority and a poor majority. When we impose no redistributive 
taxation, our experimental results confirm the well-known effectiveness of these markets in 
generating efficient outcomes. Remarkably, efficiency is only about two percentage points 
lower when we impose full redistribution (i.e., subjects know that their after-tax incomes 
will all be the same). We attribute this still relatively high efficiency to the fact that subjects 
keep  on  trading relative well in spite of substantially lower marginal incentives. 
Interestingly, full redistribution increases price volatility, but this increase seems to be 
caused by subjects trading more aggressively in order to avoid inefficient transactions and 
ensure large welfare gains from redistribution. 30 
We endogenize the level of redistribution by having two candidates compete through 
tax policies on which citizens vote in simple majority elections. Consistent with median voter 
theories, we observe that candidates woo the poor majority with high tax rates and citizens 
vote in accordance to their self-interest. This behavior yields (almost) fully egalitarian 
income distributions in nearly all societies. The effects observed in the double auction 
market with full redistribution translate to those with endogenous taxation, but are slightly 
weaker because winning tax rates are (anticipated to be) somewhat smaller than one. 
We also give citizens the opportunity to lobby by transferring money to the candidates, 
who are not obliged to choose a specific tax policy after being lobbied. In this way, the rich 
minority can use their superior financial means to try to induce candidates to reduce income 
redistribution. Although we observe substantial amounts of transfers in the first period, 
lobbying  by the rich breaks down due to counteractive lobbying by  the poor, 
miscoordination  between rich citizens, and miscoordination between candidates. 
Consequently, candidates end up choosing high tax rates. With exception of the high lobbying 
transfers in the first period, these results are consistent with our equilibrium predictions. In 
other words, in our experiment the “one person, one vote” principle determines the final 
income distribution. 
Our experimental results support the notion that both double auction markets and 
simple majority elections with compulsory voting remain as reliable in coexistence as they 
are in isolation. Consequently, given that we see high redistribution rates in our experiment, 
the  worldwide  persistence of poor majorities in democracies must be attributed to 
institutions and factors other than those studied in this paper. In this sense, the advantage of 
our basic setup is that it can easily accommodate additional influences. For instance, one can 
study the effect of giving the rich outside options (e.g., by moving to societies with lower 
taxes or by switching to leisurely activities), which might induce poor citizens to support 
lower  levels of redistribution.  Another option is to help candidates and lobbyists  reach 
implicit or explicit agreements by facilitating coordination among the rich (for them to better 
target their transfers) or among the candidates (to react in unison to lobbying efforts). For 
example, Großer, Reuben, and Tymula (2009a) show experimentally that if only one rich 31 
subject (e.g., an organized special interest group) but no poor subjects can transfer money to 
the candidates and there is repeated interaction,  then  lobbying can indeed  influence 
redistribution. In another study (Großer, Reuben, and Tymula  2009b), the same authors 
show similar results for the situation where the rich can reward candidates after elections 
are held. Finally, future research could limit the amount of information provided to citizens 
and candidates in our experiment. For example, if citizens are little or not informed about 
the distribution of individual and average pre-tax incomes, overconfidence may lead them to 
believe they earn more than average and, hence, to vote for less redistribution. 
Overall, our experiment is  as a first step to obtain a better understanding of the 
interaction of markets and elections  and its welfare consequences. Naturally, in the 
laboratory we have to choose specific procedures and parameters. We want to stress, 
however, that our choices are nonetheless representative of many of the incentives people 
face outside of the laboratory. In  this respect, we believe that our experiment provides 
evidence that markets that generate stark income inequalities and elections that redistribute 
this income can work well in unison. 
 
Appendix A – Market equilibrium and redistribution 
Here, we analyze how expected redistribution may affect the posting and accepting of prices 
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where 𝑛𝑛 denotes the number of traders (we assume that there is at least one seller and one 
buyer); 𝑢𝑢 ≡ ∑ 𝑚𝑚ℎ
𝑛𝑛
ℎ=1  the total number of units in the market, and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1 the number of units 
each  𝑖𝑖  possesses  (recall that we used 𝑛𝑛 = 10,  𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 2  for all 𝑖𝑖,  and  hence  𝑢𝑢 = 20  in our 
experiment). Moreover, 𝜋𝜋 �𝑢𝑢 ≡
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ℎ=1  gives the average pre-tax income of all units 32 
and 𝜋𝜋 �𝑢𝑢,−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡
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ℎ=1 � the average pre-tax income of all units in the market 
other than the 𝑖𝑖th unit of 𝑖𝑖. Using expressions (1) and (2), we can derive a seller’s minimum 
willingness to accept for her 𝑖𝑖th unit, 𝑝𝑝min,𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠 , and a buyer’s maximum willingness to pay for 
her 𝑖𝑖th unit, 𝑝𝑝max,𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏 . Specifically, seller 𝑖𝑖 has an incentive to sell her 𝑖𝑖th unit at price 𝑝𝑝 if her 
expected after-tax market income from trading this unit is at least as high as that from not 
trading, or formally, iff 
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the difference in 𝑖𝑖’s subjective expectations about the average pre-tax incomes at market 
closing of all units other than her 𝑖𝑖th unit for not trading, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(.) = 0, and trading, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(.) = 1 
(note that a positive ∆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋 �𝑢𝑢,−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� means that 𝑖𝑖 expects her unit to contribute relatively less to 
welfare than other units that may still be traded); 𝜅𝜅  denotes the common knowledge 
obtained about all market activity in the current period up till her decision to trade (e.g., 
about the specific trading path so far); and 𝗽𝗽𝑖𝑖 denotes her subjective beliefs about all other 
costs and values in the market.27
𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝑝𝑝min,𝑖𝑖





× max�0,∆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋 �𝑢𝑢,−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�� 
 Note from conditions (3) and (4) that a trader 𝑖𝑖’s expected 
after-tax market income from trading her 𝑖𝑖th unit at price p consists of a private component 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, weighted by 1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢−1
𝑢𝑢 , on the left-hand sides) and a welfare component (∆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋 �𝑢𝑢,−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�, 
weighted by 𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢−1
𝑢𝑢 , on the right-hand sides). Rearranging both conditions yields 
(5) 
and 
                                                             
27 Note that 𝜅𝜅 and 𝗽𝗽𝑖𝑖 are typically not independent from each other—that is, subjective beliefs about all other 
costs and values in the market are updated based on observed market activity. However, for our purpose this 
relationship does not need to be specified further. 33 
𝑝𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑝max,𝑖𝑖
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where the ‘min’ and ‘max’ operators account for the trading rules that 𝑝𝑝 ≥ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝 ≤ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
Condition (5) shows that seller 𝑖𝑖 may only have an incentive to sell her 𝑖𝑖th unit if the price is 
sufficiently higher than her costs and, similarly, condition (6) shows that buyer 𝑖𝑖 may only 
have an incentive to buy her 𝑖𝑖th unit if the price is sufficiently lower than her value. In other 
words,  a seller’s minimum  willingness to accept  may increase and a buyer’s maximum 
willingness to pay may decrease. As a consequence, the supply and demand curves shown in 
Figure 1 may shift inwards, and stronger so for higher ∆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋 �𝑢𝑢,−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� and higher tax rates, 𝑡𝑡 
(because 𝜕𝜕�𝑡𝑡
𝑢𝑢−1
𝑢𝑢 1 − 𝑡𝑡
𝑢𝑢−1





Appendix B – Zero-intelligence market traders 
 Such inward shifts essentially 
mean that trading may become more aggressive—that is, sellers and buyers may post higher 
and lower prices, respectively. If their subjective beliefs about her own unit’s cost or value 
relative to other costs and values in the market are monotonic—that is, are preserving the 
ranking of actual costs and values—and if subjective expectations about tax rates are not too 
diverse, inefficient transactions become less likely. Moreover, if 𝑢𝑢 and 𝑡𝑡 get large, possible 
supply and demand curve shifts can become very large (bounded by 100 and 0) for those 
units that sellers and buyers believe to be inefficient—that is, have a positive ∆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋 �𝑢𝑢,−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�. 
Note that if it is common knowledge that 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖[𝑡𝑡] = 1 for all 𝑖𝑖 and that everyone knows whether 
her units are efficient or inefficient, then there are many equilibria in which only efficient 
units are traded—at any feasible prices—but no inefficient units (because in our static 
equilibrium analysis a market price is unique for all transactions, Proposition 1 holds also for 
this case). 
The simulation for zero-intelligence traders was done for the market described in subsection 
2.1 and with the same number of buyers and sellers and the same costs and values depicted 
in Figure 1. The results presented in Table 2 are the result of running 50,000 periods. Each 
                                                             
28 Note that since ∆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋 �𝑢𝑢,−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� is a subjective expectation, which may or may not be accurate with respect to actual 
average pre-tax incomes at market closing, the order of specific units may be different than shown in Figure 1. 34 
period of the simulated market followed the following sequence (the code of the simulation 
is available in the online appendix): 
1.  One citizen (a robot buyer or seller) is randomly drawn from the society, each with 
equal probability.  
2.  If the chosen citizen is a robot seller, it makes an offer by drawing a random number 
between the cost of its current unit and the highest possible value (using a uniform 
distribution). If the chosen citizen is a robot  buyer, it makes a bid  by drawing a 
random number between the value of its current unit and the lowest possible cost 
(using a uniform distribution).  These  bounds for the draws are  chosen because 
prices below the lowest cost and above the highest value are never accepted.  
3.  If the chosen citizen is a robot buyer and its bid is higher than the current posted 
offer then the transaction occurs at the posted offer’s price between the robot buyer 
and the corresponding robot seller. If its bid is lower than the current poster offer 
but higher than the current posted bid then its bid becomes the new posted bid. 
Lastly, if its bid is lower than the current posted bid nothing happens. If the chosen 
citizen is a robot seller and its offer is lower than the current posted bid then the 
transaction occurs at the posted bid’s price between the robot seller  and the 
corresponding robot buyer. If its offer is higher than the current poster bid but lower 
than the current posted offer then its offer becomes the new posted offer. Lastly, if its 
offer is higher than the current posted offer nothing happens. 
4.  Steps 1 through 3 are repeated until there are no more possible transactions or up to 
a maximum number of postings 𝑡𝑡. This maximum number of postings is determined 
at the beginning of each period by randomly drawing a value from the distribution 𝑋𝑋, 
where 𝑋𝑋  is the observed distribution of postings per period in the Market-0 
treatment. The reason we use this limit to the number of transactions is that robot 
traders are not restricted by the two minutes during which the market is open. In 
order to make the simulation as comparable to the experiment as possible, we use 
the number of executed transactions in Market-0 as representing the effect of the 
time during which the market is open. The results do not vary considerably if we 35 
change this assumption. Essentially, a smaller or larger mean for 𝑋𝑋 affects the mean 
number of transactions but not the other statistics. 
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